Battle of Payne's Farm
From CivilWarWiki
| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Payne's Farm
At 0700 on the morning of the 27th the III Corps troops began their move toward Robertson's Tavern and the long overdue link-up with Warren's II Corps. BG Prince took the precaution of setting out a screen of skirmishers on his right between his line of march and the last known location of the enemy. The march proceeded to a crossroad at the Widow Morris Farm where it came to a halt while a decision over which road to take was made. Prince sent a request for guidance to French, who immediately compounded the problem by sending a confusing set of instructions to Prince. Prince requested clarification and was ordered down the right hand fork even though "the left road was shown to be passable." Against his better judgment Prince prepared his troops for the
movement that he knew would be contested. Once everything was in order he received word from French that he was on the wrong road and to "cease all operations." Prince rode to Corps headquarters and consulted with French who changed his mind again and told Prince "to go on with my division" down the road previously selected. More than two hours were wasted as the two men bickered over the proper course of action.
A short distance to the west MG Edward Johnson was having no trouble deciding what to do with his division of Confederates. Ordered by Early (Commanding Ewell's Corps) to march down Raccoon Ford Road and take up a position on Rodes left at Locust Grove he formulated his movement plan. The order of march was established as Jones Brigade of Virginians in the van, followed by Stafford's Louisiana Brigade, the famous "Stonewall" Brigade, the ambulance train and artillery, and Steuart's Brigade providing rear security. The column moved without incident until they reached ?the junction of an obscure road? where Prince's skirmishers stumbled into the Confederate ambulance train. Steuart immediately deployed skirmishers and reported the contact to Johnson, who rode back to personally assess the situation. After a short inspection Johnson ordered Steuart to ?"throw back his left and form his brigade at right angles to the road" while the rest of the division counter-marched to his aid. The returning brigades were quickly formed into a line of battle and ordered to throw out one regiment each as skirmishers "to feel the enemy." They advanced through about 500 yards of heavy foliage before they struck the Union main body.
The Confederates were eventually overcome by vastly superior numbers and forced to retreat from the Payne's Farm fields to the edge of the wood . When the larger Federal force refused to seize the initiative Johnson settled on a bold plan. At 1600 he ordered a general advance. The Union line was driven back as the Confederate line slowly wheeled to their left. The momentum of the attack, however, could not be maintained as the brigades and regiments became disconnected by the terrain and vegetation. Once again they retreated, nearly out of ammunition, to a fence line skirting an open field.
The confused back and forth affair did not lack for other heroic actions. The Confederate leaders once again leading from the front paid dearly. Colonel Raleigh Colston,commanding the 2nd Virginia was severely wounded in the leg and would die of pneumonia a month after the amputation. Also lost was Lt Colonel Walton of the 23rd Virginia. Equally as brave and much more fortunate was BG J. A. Walker, commander of the "Stonewall" Brigade. When one of his regiments began to falter he "seized the colors, leaped his horse over a fence" and rode to the front to rally the men within 80 yards of the Union line. Despite drawing an immense amount of fire he survived his exploit unwounded. On the extreme left reinforcements from Birney's Division moved up an attempted to turn the Confederate line but were driven back by canister fired with "great gallantry" by Carpenter's Battery.
The Confederate losses amounted to 545 men (69k, 429w, 47m) but they had accomplished a feat worthy of the loss. Johnson's 5300 men had attacked and delayed a Union force five times their number. Had the Federal column not been delayed by their own mismanagement and the audaciousness of Johnson's troops they would have struck Rodes division squarely in the left flank and rear and could have easily rolled up his entire command.
| ||||||||
